

# Two Definitions of Lying

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**ABSTRACT:** This article first examines a number of different definitions of lying, from Aldert Vrij, Warren Shibles, Sissela Bok, the *Oxford English Dictionary*, Linda Coleman and Paul Kay, and Joseph Kupfer. It considers objections to all of them, and then defends Kupfer's definition, as well as a modified version of his definition, as the best of those so far considered. Next, it examines five other definitions of lying, from Harry G. Frankfurt, Roderick M. Chisholm and Thomas D. Feehan, David Simpson, Thomas Carson, and Don Fallis. It finds reason to reject these definitions, in favor of the two definitions of lying previously defended, namely:

- (i) To lie (to another person) = *df.* to make a believed-false statement (to another person) with the intention that that statement be believed to be true (by the other person).
- (ii) To lie (to another person) = *df.* to make a believed-false statement (to another person), either with the intention that that statement be believed to be true (by the other person), or with the intention that it be believed (by the other person) that that statement is believed to be true (by the person making the statement), or with both intentions.

There is no universally agreed upon definition of lying.<sup>1</sup> It is commonly agreed that, as contrasted with the verb 'deceive,' which is a success or achievement verb like 'persuade' or 'cure,' the verb 'lie' is not a success or achievement verb.<sup>2</sup> The speech act of lying is not a perlocutionary speech act. That is, whether or not an act of lying has occurred does not depend on whether a particular effect, such as a false belief, has been produced.<sup>3</sup> A lie that is 'seen through' by its audience while it is being told to them, and hence, that does not deceive them, is still a lie.<sup>4</sup> Properly speaking, therefore, lying is not a type of deceiving. Beyond this, there is little consensus on defining lying. Although most hold that lying requires that one make a statement, some hold that merely acting in an intentionally deceptive way is lying. On this view, for example, faking a limp is lying. Some even hold that simply remaining silent, with a deceptive intention, is a 'lie of omission.' Although most hold that lying requires that one make a statement that one believes to be false (an untruthful statement), some hold that it is possible to lie by

making a statement that one believes to be true (a truthful statement), so long as this is done with a deceptive intention. Although most hold that in order to lie one must be addressing someone, some hold that it is possible to lie to eavesdroppers. Some even hold that it is possible to lie to no one at all, not even oneself—that, for instance, simply making untruthful statements in an empty room can be lying. Although many hold that lying requires an intention to deceive, even if it does not require that deception occur, some hold that lying does not require any intention to deceive, and that making an untruthful statement under certain conditions is lying, irrespective of intention. Although most hold that lying does not require falsity, and instead only requires believed-falsity (untruthfulness), some hold that lying requires falsity, and that making untruthful statements to others with the intention to deceive is not lying if, unbeknownst to one, what one says just happens to be true. Finally, although most hold that lying requires an intention to deceive about the contents of one's untruthful statement, some hold that lying also requires an intention to deceive about one's belief in the truth of one's untruthful statement. According to them, when one lies, one intends not only that others believe that what one says is true, but also that they believe that one believes that what one says is true. Some even go further, and hold that lying requires a third intention to deceive—an intention that others believe that one intends that they believe that one believes that what one says is true.

This article will first examine a number of different definitions of lying, from Aldert Vrij, Warren Shibles, Sissela Bok, the *Oxford English Dictionary*, Linda Coleman and Paul Kay, and Joseph Kupfer. It will consider objections to all of them, and then defend Kupfer's definition, as well as a modified version of his definition, as the best of those so far considered. Next, it will examine five further definitions of lying, from Harry Frankfurt, Roderick M. Chisholm and Thomas D. Feehan, David Simpson, Thomas L. Carson, and Don Fallis. It will find reason to reject these definitions, in favor of the two definitions of lying previously defended.

## VRIJ'S DEFINITION

David Livingstone Smith has an extremely broad definition of lying: "I define lying as *any* form of behavior the function of which is to provide others with false information or to deprive them of true information."<sup>5</sup> Smith agrees with boxer Joe Torres that "A feint is an outright lie,"<sup>6</sup> and contends that "Breast implants, hairpieces, feigned illnesses, faked orgasms, and phony smiles are just a few examples of nonverbal lying."<sup>7</sup> Smith's definition does not require intentions: "I purposefully use the term 'function' rather than 'intention.'"<sup>8</sup> Although, according to this definition, lying does not require an intention on the part of the liar, it appears that behavior that only accidentally provides "others with false information or to deprive them of true information" is not lying, and that the behavior in question must have the *function* of providing "others with false information or to deprive them of true information."<sup>9</sup> Importantly, according to Smith, merely doing something that deprives others of "true information"<sup>10</sup> is lying, even if no false beliefs are created. That is to say, keeping a secret is lying.<sup>11</sup>

According to Smith, leaf insects lie: “These bugs do not intend to deceive the creatures that want to make a meal of them and can no more change their physical shape than you or I can. Camouflage, a form of deception, is nonetheless a function of their bodily form.”<sup>12</sup> It is not clear, however, how simply possessing a physical shape and/or coloration constitutes a “form of behavior.” Hence, it is not clear how an insect’s possessing a physical shape that resembles a plant constitutes lying. Is a plant that resembles an insect engaged in a “form of behavior”? If so, then plants can lie. Exactly what constitutes “behavior” is unclear from what Smith says. Because of these problems, Smith’s extremely broad definition of lying will not be considered further.

Paul Ekman has a definition of lying that is narrower than Smith’s, although it is still a very broad definition. Ekman does not distinguish between lying and deceiving (“I use the words interchangeably”),<sup>13</sup> but he does hold that both are necessarily intentional. Ekman holds that concealing information with the intention to mislead another—that is, concealing information from another with the intention that the other believe something false—is lying, and that engaging in non-verbal behavior with the intention to mislead another is also lying. He also holds that lying is necessarily without prior notification or consent. He defines lying as follows:

In my definition of a lie or deceit, then, one person intends to mislead another, doing so deliberately, without prior notification of this purpose, and without having been explicitly asked to do so by the target. There are two primary ways to lie: to *conceal* and to *falsify*. In concealing, the liar withholds some information without actually saying anything untrue. In falsifying, an additional step is taken. Not only does the liar withhold true information, but he presents false information as if it were true.<sup>14</sup>

Unlike Smith, Ekman holds that, in order to lie, it is not sufficient to conceal information, even intentionally.<sup>15</sup> One must also have the intention that the other person believe something to be true that one believes to be false. This is because it is possible to intentionally conceal information from someone without the intention that the other person believe something to be true that one believes to be false. Indeed, one can intentionally conceal information from someone without the intention that the other person believe anything in particular at all. For example, I may intentionally conceal from my friend that I saw a Bugatti Veyron on my way to work, without any intention that my friend believe anything in particular at all (I know that he is not interested in supercars). In such a case, I am not lying, according to Ekman’s definition.

There is at least one problem with Ekman’s definition of lying. According to it, a liar is only a liar if she withholds “true information” with an intention to mislead (without prior notification, and without having been asked to do so). If one believes something to be true which is in fact false, and one intentionally withholds this believed-true falsehood from another person, with the intention that this other person believes something else to be true that one believes to be false (without prior notification, and without having been asked to do so), then one is *not* lying. For example, if you say to me, “The library closes at midnight,” and I believe this to be false, because I believe that the library closes at nine o’clock, and

I intentionally withhold this believed-information from you, with the intention that you believe that the library closes at midnight (without prior notification, and without having been asked to do so), then, if it happens to be true that the library closes at midnight, and hence, I happen to be wrong, and you happen to be right, it follows that I am not lying. According to Ekman's definition, one cannot lie about something about which one is mistaken. Partly for this reason, his definition has been rejected.

Aldert Vrij agrees with Ekman that "Lying does not necessarily require the use of words. The athlete who fakes a foot injury after a bad performance is lying without using words. It is also possible to lie by hiding information, although again this must happen intentionally."<sup>16</sup> Vrij also agrees with him that "people are only lying when they do not inform others in advance about their intention to lie. Magicians are therefore not lying during their performance, as people in the audience expect to be deceived."<sup>17</sup> However, Vrij departs from Ekman in holding that "Liars sometimes do not succeed in misleading targets although they have a clear intention to do so."<sup>18</sup> Vrij allows that a person may fail to mislead another because they are mistaken. Vrij's definition of lying is as follows: "*a successful or unsuccessful deliberate attempt, without forewarning, to create in another a belief which the communicator considers to be untrue.*"<sup>19</sup> "[D]eliberate attempt" may be a semantic pleonasm, since all attempting may be said to be intentional. Hence, this definition may be shortened, and put more formally, as follows:

(L1) To lie (to another person) =<sub>df</sub> to attempt to create a believed-false belief without forewarning (in another person).

Like Ekman, Vrij does not distinguish between 'lie' and 'deceive.' Hence, he offers his definition as a definition of lying or deceiving. However, this is peculiar. To deceive is not merely to attempt to cause a believed-false belief in another.<sup>20</sup> To deceive is to succeed in doing so, where the believed-false belief *is* false. Hence, Vrij's definition will be taken as a definition of lying only.

According to L1, feigning a yawn, wearing a hairpiece, making a phony smile, wearing an engagement ring when one is not engaged, not wearing a wedding ring when one is married, or pretending to talk to someone on a cell phone, etc., is lying. At least, when it is done with the intention that it be believed that one is tired, or that one has one's hair, or that one is enjoying oneself, or that one is engaged, or that one is not married, or that one is talking to someone, when one is not, respectively, and when there has been no forewarning about one's intention, then it is lying. According to L1, remaining silent, with the intention that someone believe something to be true that is believed-false, without forewarning, is also lying. In the example above about the library's closing time, according to L1, I am lying. Indeed, I am lying to you in this case even if you know that I am intentionally withholding something that I believe to be true with the intention that you believe something else to be true that I believe to be false (but that is true).

L1 may have the merit of making lying intentional, and hence, of ruling out the possibility of calling plants liars. L1 may also have the merit of making it the case that lying need not succeed in deceiving anyone in order to be lying. However,

the vast majority rejects L1 as too broad a definition of lying. It does seem that L1 is merely a definition of *attempting to deceive*. As such, it is too broad, since lying is not merely attempting to deceive (or even, perhaps, is not necessarily attempting to deceive). Hence, it seems that L1 should be rejected.

### SHIBLES'S DEFINITION

Warren Shibles defines lying as follows: "A lie is merely a contradiction between belief (self-talk) and expression"<sup>21</sup> (cf. "Lying was defined on the new theory as: conscious expression of other than what we believe").<sup>22</sup> Shibles's definition of lying may be put more formally, as follows:

(L2) To lie (to another person) =<sub>df.</sub> to make a believed-false statement (to another person).

In *Against Lying* Augustine says that "He lies, moreover, who holds one opinion in his mind and who gives expression to another through words or any other outward manifestation".<sup>23</sup> Paul Griffiths has taken this to be Augustine's definition of lying,<sup>24</sup> and if this is correct, then Augustine accepts L2—although it must be admitted that this interpretation of Augustine is controversial.<sup>25</sup>

L2 differs from L1 in a number of ways, at least one of which is that it requires that a statement be made. A person may be said to make a statement when a person believes that there is some expression, and some language, such that one of the standard uses of the expression in that language is that of expressing some proposition, and the person utters, writes or signs that expression with the intention that it be believed that she intended to utter (etc.) that expression with that standard use.<sup>26</sup> Making a statement therefore requires the use of conventional signs, as opposed to natural or causal signs, since it requires the uttering (etc.) of an expression in a language. It is possible for a person to sign expressions using American Sign Language, smoke signals, Morse code, semaphore flags, and so forth, as well as by making specific bodily gestures whose meanings have been established by convention. Hence, it is possible for a person to make statements by making smoke signals, or by nodding her head in response to a question, etc. Hence, according to L2, it is possible to lie by making smoke signals, or by nodding one's head in response to a question, etc.

Insofar as a person is not signing an expression in a language when, for example, she feigns a yawn, wears a hairpiece, or wears an engagement ring when she is not engaged, it follows that, according to L2, a person cannot be lying by feigning a yawn or wearing a hairpiece or an engagement ring, even if she intends to deceive by these means.<sup>27</sup> In the case of a person who does not utter a declarative sentence, but who, for example, curses, or makes an interjection or an exclamation, or issues a command or an exhortation, or asks a question, or says "Hello," then, if it is not one of the standard uses of that expression in that language to express some proposition, and the person does not intend that it be believed that she intended to utter that expression with that standard use, it follows that, according to L2, a person cannot be lying when she does any of these things. Finally, since, according to L2, lying requires that a person utter (etc.) an

expression, it is not possible, according to L2, for a person to lie by omission. That is, it is not possible for a person to lie by omitting to utter (etc.) an expression. It is possible for a person to lie by remaining 'silent,' if the 'silence' is a previously agreed upon signal with others that is equivalent to uttering an expression in a language. However, such a lie would not be a lie of omission.

L2 only requires that an untruthful statement be made. It does not require that the statement be made to anyone. According to L2, it is possible to lie to no one, not even to oneself. According to L2, if a person goes into a room he believes to be empty, and utters untruthful statements, then that person is lying. According to L2, therefore, lying is simply untruthfulness, where untruthfulness means the making of a statement that one believes to be false.

L2 may have the merit of requiring, for lying, that a statement be made, and hence, of ruling out the possibility that feigning a yawn, or wearing a hairpiece, or wearing an engagement ring, can be lying. L2 may also have the merit of ruling out the possibility of lying by omission. However, the vast majority also rejects L2, because it allows for the possibility of lying to no one. The "an utterance of *p* [a believed-false statement] by a speaker in an otherwise deserted room" is such that it "cannot . . . count as a lie."<sup>28</sup> It does seem wrong that simply making an untruthful statement, to no one, is lying. Hence, it seems that L2 should be rejected.

## BOK'S DEFINITION

Sissela Bok says the following about lying:

When we undertake to deceive others intentionally, we communicate messages to mislead them, meant to make them believe what we ourselves do not believe. We can do so through gesture, through disguise, by means of action or inaction, even through silence. Which of these innumerable deceptive messages are also lies? I shall define as a lie any intentionally deceptive message that is *stated*. Such statements are most often made verbally or in writing, but can of course also be conveyed via smoke signals, Morse code, sign language, and the like. Deception, then, is the larger category, and lying forms part of it.<sup>29</sup>

To lie to another person, according to Bok, is to communicate a message, in the form of a statement, to another person, that is intended to make the other person believe what one does not believe. Interpreting "make them believe what we ourselves do not believe" to mean make the other person believe to be true what one believes to be false, and interpreting "message that is *stated*" to mean make a statement, this definition may be put more formally as follows:

(L3) To lie (to another person) = <sub>df.</sub> to make a statement (to another person) with the intention to deceive (the other person).

John Barnes endorses Bok's definition: "a lie, for our purposes, is a statement intended to deceive a dupe about the state of the world, including the intentions and attitudes of the liar."<sup>30</sup> Nathan Rotenstreich also accepts L3: "a lie as a statement with intention to deceive; the statement as such may be true, but considered from the aspect of its intent, it is a lie."<sup>31</sup> L3 differs from L2 in a number of ways. Although, like L2, it requires that a statement be made, unlike

L2, it does not require that the statement be an untruthful statement. According to L3, it is possible to lie by making a truthful (and, indeed, true) statement.<sup>32</sup> Unlike L2, it also requires that it be intended that someone believe to be true something that is believed to be false. However, L3 does not require that someone believe to be true the statement that is made. According to L3, a person may lie by making a believed-true statement, with the intention that another person believe something else to be true, something that is believed to be false by the person making the statement. Arnold Isenberg, who appears to hold that this is not a lie, provides an example of such a case:

Suppose there is a report in the paper which I believe to be inaccurate. I say to another man, "The paper says . . ." believing that he will trust the newspaper report. There is no doubt of my intention to make him believe something which I do not believe. But is it a lie?<sup>33</sup>

Examples of such a case do not have to be invented, however. There was the case of the young woman in the Netherlands during the German occupation whose brothers were hiding in a small potato cellar under the floor, reached by a hidden trapdoor under the kitchen table. The German soldiers asked her where her brothers were hiding, and she said to them, truthfully, "Why, they're under the table."<sup>34</sup> She said this with the intention that they would believe that her brothers were not under the table, something that she believed to be false. If L3 is correct, then she lied to the soldiers.

L3 may have the merit of requiring that lying involve an intention to deceive, and hence, of ruling out the possibility of lying to no audience whatsoever (not even an eavesdropping audience). However, the vast majority also rejects L3, because it allows for the possibility of lying by making a truthful statement: "But intuition balks at the suggestion that a speaker can lie by uttering a proposition she believes to be true, even where her intention is to deceive the hearer."<sup>35</sup> It does seem that it is not clear why, when one makes a truthful statement with the intention that another person believe something else to be true that one believes to false, one is not simply attempting to deceive by means of a truthful statement, instead of lying. Bok's distinction between attempting to deceive (in general), and lying (in particular), entails that just doing something with an intention to deceive is not sufficient to make what one does lying. However, it does seem peculiar to make the distinction between lying and not lying hang on the question of whether one makes a *truthful* statement, as her definition does. Hence, it seems that L3 should be rejected.

### **OED DEFINITION**

The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines a lie as "a false statement made with the intent to deceive." *Webster's International Dictionary of the English Language* similarly defines to lie as "to make an untrue statement with the intention to deceive." The dictionary definition of lying may be put more formally as follows:

(L4) To lie (to another person) =<sub>df.</sub> to make a false statement (to another person) with the intention to deceive (some person or other).

Bernard Gert also accepts L4: “intending to deceive by means of making a false statement, which is what lying is.”<sup>36</sup> L4 differs from L3 in a number of ways. Although, like L3, it requires that there be an intention to deceive, as well as that a statement be made, unlike L3, it requires that the statement that is made be a false statement. Note, however, that there is no requirement that the statement be *believed* to be false. According to L4, it is possible to lie by making a truthful statement that just so happens to be false, so long as one makes the truthful statement with the intention to deceive. For example, if Bina truthfully tells Elin, “There is not a board meeting on Thursday,” with the intention that Elin believe there is not a board meeting this week, which Bina believes to be false (since Bina believes that there is a board meeting on Wednesday), then Bina is lying to Elin, if Bina is mistaken, and there is a board meeting on Thursday. According to L4, therefore, untruthfulness is not required for lying. One can lie by being truthful with an intention to deceive, when it just so happens that one is mistaken.

Furthermore, according to L4, it is possible to lie to eavesdroppers, and not merely to the person to whom one is addressing one’s statement. Consider the following case:

Consider three men who speak English: *L*, *D*, and an accomplice *C*. *L* is speaking to *C* and he knows that *D* overhears the conversation; *L* says to *C*, “There are no police on the road in front of us,” and he says this with the intention of causing *D* to *believe* that there are no police on the road; but *L* believes that there *are* police on the road; and the accomplice *C* believes, as *L* does, that there are police on the road in front of them and he knows why it is that *L* has made his statement.<sup>37</sup>

In this case, assuming that it is false that there are no police on the road in front of them, Lydiard (*L*) makes the false statement “There are no police on the road in front of us,” to Christian (*C*), with the intention of deceiving Dean (*D*), who is eavesdropping, about there being no police on the road in front of them. According to L4, *L* is lying.

L4 may have the merit of ruling out the possibility of lying by making a truthful and true statement. However, the vast majority also rejects L4. Some reject L4 because it allows for the possibility of mistaken truthful lying. They do not accept that Bina is lying to Elin about the board meeting, because Bina’s statement just happens to be false, even if Bina is attempting to deceive Elin by means of a truthful statement. It does seem peculiar that whether or not one is lying depends upon luck. Others reject L4 because it allows for the possibility of lying to eavesdroppers. They do not accept that in the eavesdropping case Lydiard is lying to anyone. Since Lydiard is not attempting to deceive Christian, his accomplice, and since Lydiard is not addressing Dean, the person he is attempting to deceive, they hold that Lydiard is not lying to anyone in this case. It does seem that, in both of these cases, it is better to say that one person is attempting to deceive another person, rather than to say that someone is lying to someone. Hence, it seems that L4 should be rejected.

## COLEMAN AND KAY’S DEFINITION

Linda Coleman and Paul Kay have a definition of lying that is more complex than any so far considered. They define lying as “the speaker (*S*) asserts some proposition

(P) to an addressee (A),” where “P is false,” and “S believes P to be false,” and “In uttering P, S intends to deceive A.”<sup>38</sup> Interpreting “S intends to deceive A” to mean “S intends to deceive A about P,” this definition of lying is as follows:

(L5) To lie (to another person) = *df.* to make a believed-false and false statement (to another person) with the intention that that statement be believed to be true (by the other person).

L5 differs from L4 in a number of ways. Although, like L4, it requires that the statement that is made be false, unlike L4, it requires that the statement that is made be untruthful. Furthermore, although, like L4, it requires that there be an intention to deceive, unlike L4, it requires that the intended victim be the person to whom the statement is made. Hence, L5 rules out lying to eavesdroppers.

The requirement for lying that the statement be false, as well as untruthful, entails that a person is not lying if she makes an untruthful statement with a deceptive intention, which, unbeknownst to her, just happens to be true. In Jean-Paul Sartre’s short-story *Le Mur* (*The Wall*), the prisoner Pablo Ibbieta is being interrogated by his guards as to the whereabouts of the leader of the resistance, Ramon Gris. Ibbieta believes that Gris is hiding out at his cousins’ house. He tells the guards that Gris is hiding in the cemetery. Unbeknownst to Ibbieta, Gris has moved from his cousins’ house to the cemetery. Gris is captured, and Ibbieta is released.<sup>39</sup> According to L5, Ibbieta does not lie to the guards, since what he tells the guards happens to be true, although he believes it to be false.

L5 may have the merit of requiring untruthfulness for lying, and of ruling out the possibility of lying to eavesdroppers. However, most reject L5 also, because they do not accept that a person is not lying simply because the untruthful statement that she makes with the intention to deceive her addressee just happens to be true. They hold that, in the case of Ibbieta and the guards, Ibbieta is lying, even if his statement happens to be true. It does seem wrong to deny that Ibbieta is lying, simply because his statement happens to be true. It does seem peculiar that whether or not one is lying depends upon luck. Hence, it seems that L5 should be rejected.

## KUPFER’S DEFINITION

Joseph Kupfer defines lying as follows: “A person lies when he asserts something to another which he believes to be false with the intention of getting the other to believe it to be true.”<sup>40</sup> This definition of lying may be put more formally as follows:

(L6) To lie (to another person) = *df.* to make a believed-false statement (to another person) with the intention that that statement be believed to be true (by the other person).

Igor Primoratz accepts L6: “[lying is] making a statement believed to be false, with the intention of getting another to accept it as true.”<sup>41</sup> Bernard Williams also accepts L6: “I take a lie to be an assertion, the content of which the speaker believes to be false, which is made with the intention to deceive the hearer with regard to that content.”<sup>42</sup>

Like L5, L6 rules out lying to eavesdroppers, and requires that the statement that is made be untruthful, and that there be an intention to deceive. It differs from L5 only in not requiring that the statement be false. According to L5, Ibbieta does lie to the guards, even though what he tells the guards happens to be true.

If any definition of lying may lay claim to being the standard definition of lying, then it is L6. As Williams has said, "this is what most people understand by the word 'lie'; despite a very promiscuous use of it by some theoretical writers, it seems to me that in every day use this is clearly its definition."<sup>43</sup>

L6 is not without its problems, however. Some have argued that, although an intention to deceive is required for lying, it need not be an intention to deceive about the contents of the statement that is made. Instead, it may be an intention to deceive about one's belief in the truth of the statement that one makes. For example, say that Maximilian is a crime boss, and Alessandro is an FBI agent working undercover in Maximilian's criminal organization. Say that Maximilian knows that Alessandro is an undercover agent, and Alessandro has no suspicion of this. If Maximilian says to Alessandro, in confidence, "There are no informants in my organization," then Maximilian cannot intend that Alessandro believe this statement to be true, because he knows that Alessandro is an informant. This is known as the "*intentionality condition*," whereby, if *S* and *A* are persons, and *p* is a believed false statement, then "*S* cannot intend to get *A* to believe that *p* if *S* knows, or believes, that it is impossible to get *A* to believe that *p*."<sup>44</sup> In this case, Maximilian can only intend that Alessandro believe that Maximilian believes this statement to be true. According to L6, Maximilian is not lying to Alessandro. However, some hold that Maximilian is indeed lying to Alessandro, since he intends to deceive Alessandro about his believing his statement to be true. Although, they hold, the intended deception in lying usually pertains to the believed false statement, it does not have to do so:

It should first be noted that [where *S* is a liar, *p* is a proposition, and *p* is '*S*-false' iff *S* believes that *p* is false] the *S*-false target belief will usually, but not always, be the belief itself that *p*. However, in certain cases the target-belief may be something else, e.g., the belief that *S* believes that *p*. Thus *S* may lie by trying to represent her beliefs as being that *p*, although *S* knows that *A* knows that not-*p*, and therefore does not intend to induce in *A* the belief that *p*.<sup>45</sup>

At least two responses can be made to this objection to L6. The first response is to defend L6, and to insist that an intention to deceive about the contents of the statement that is made is required for lying. This is to insist that Maximilian is not lying to Alessandro. The second response is to modify L6 in such a way that either an intention to deceive about the contents of the statement that is made, or an intention to deceive about the beliefs of the person making the statement, or both, is required for lying. This is to allow that Maximilian is lying to Alessandro. This modified definition is as follows:

(L6\*) To lie (to another person) = <sub>df.</sub> to make a believed-false statement (to another person), either with the intention that that statement be believed to be true (by the other person), or with the intention that it be believed (by the other person) that that statement is believed to be true (by the person making the statement), or with both intentions.

This article contends that L6 and L6\* are the best definitions of lying of those so far considered. However, it will consider five further definitions of lying that are in contention with L6 and L6\*.

## FRANKFURT'S DEFINITION

Harry Frankfurt has a definition of lying that may be understood as an expanded version of L6, one that is very similar to L6\*:

Lying is a rather complicated act. Someone who tells a lie invariably attempts to deceive his victims about matters of two distinct kinds: first, about the state of affairs to which he explicitly refers and of which he is purporting to give a correct account; second, about his own beliefs and what is going on in his mind.<sup>46</sup>

To take the case of a person lying about how much money he has in his pocket: "someone who lies about how much money he has in his pocket both gives an account of the amount of money in his pocket and conveys that he believes this account. If the lie works, then its victim is twice deceived, having one false belief about what is in the liar's pocket and another false belief about what is in the liar's mind."<sup>47</sup> Note that Frankfurt's claim that a lie involves two intentions to deceive on the part of the liar does not entail that every lie is two lies: "I do in telling the lie tend to deceive you concerning what is in my mind even though I do not actually tell a lie about that."<sup>48</sup> Frankfurt's definition of lying may be put more formally as follows:

(L7) To lie (to another person) =<sub>df.</sub> to make a believed-false statement (to another person) with the intention that that statement be believed to be true (by the other person) and with the intention that it be believed (by the other person) that that statement is believed to be true (by the person making the statement).

L7 differs from L6\* in requiring that both intentions to deceive be present. While L7 may capture what happens in the case of many or even most lies, it rules out cases in which only one intention to deceive is present. For example, in the case of the crime boss, Maximilian, telling the undercover agent, Alessandro, "There are no informants in my organization," since Maximilian has no intention that Alessandro believe this untruthful statement to be true, but only intends that Alessandro believe that Maximilian believes it to be true, according to L7, Maximilian is not lying. However, many would argue that Maximilian is lying in this case.

According to L6 also, Maximilian is not lying. This does not mean, however, that L6 and L7 give the same answers in all cases. L7 also rules out cases in which, although there is an intention to deceive about the contents of the untruthful statement that is made, there is no intention that the other person believe that the untruthful statement is believed to be true by the person making the statement. Consider the following case of a confidence trick played on someone by two people:

For example, *S*, with a collaborator *C*, may have arranged a confidence trick with *A* as its intended victim. As part of the trick, *C*, by prior arrangement with *S*, tells *A* something to the effect that *p*, adding that *S* is unaware of this and still believes that not-*p*. For example, *C* may sit on the board of a company, and purport to

make *A* privy to some piece of price-sensitive information enabling *A* to speculate profitably in the company's shares; *p* might be "Sproggit plc is about to launch a takeover bid for the company," its assertion being designed to induce *A* to speculate by buying shares in Sproggit. *C* adds to *A* that *S* has been misled by her, *S*'s contacts in Sproggit into believing that there *won't* be any takeover bid. In fact, as *S* and *C* know, but *A* doesn't, *p* is false. *A* habitually distrusts *S* and is dispositionally counter-suggestible when confronted with her utterances, as the two fraudsters are aware (*S* has frequently lied to *A* in the past). So when *S* subsequently asserts *p* to *A*, this confirms *A*'s belief that *p*, since he thinks (rightly, though not in the way he thinks) that *S* is asserting an *S*-false [i.e., believed false by *S*] proposition, namely that Sproggit is about to launch a takeover bid; this is just what *A*, who trusts *C*, has been told to expect by *C*. In this case there seems no reason to doubt that . . . the assertion is a lie.<sup>49</sup>

In this case, Sarah (*S*) makes an untruthful statement to Andrew (*A*), namely, "Sproggit plc is about to launch a takeover bid for the company," and intends that Andrew believe it to be true. However, Sarah does not intend that Andrew believe that Sarah believes this untruthful statement to be true. That is, she does not intend that he believe that she is being truthful. Rather, Sarah intends that Andrew believe that she is being untruthful (this was the point of having Charles (*C*) lie to him). However, since Sarah intends that Andrew believe this untruthful statement to be true, Sarah intends that Andrew believe that Sarah falsely believes this untruthful statement to be false. That is, she intends that he believe that she is untruthful but mistaken. If he believes that she is untruthful but mistaken, he will believe that what she says is true, even though what she says is false. According to L7, Sarah is not lying, since Sarah does not intend that Andrew believe that she believes her untruthful statement to be true. However, many would argue that Sarah is lying. According to both L6 and L6\*, Sarah is lying.

Although this case is quite a complex case, it does seem wrong to deny that Sarah is lying. Hence, it seems that L7 should be rejected.

## CHISHOLM AND FEEHAN'S DEFINITION

Roderick M. Chisholm and Thomas D. Feehan have a complex definition of lying that relies upon a definition of assertion: "*L* lies to *D* =<sub>df.</sub> There is a proposition *p* such that (i) either *L* believes that *p* is not true or *L* believes that *p* is false and (ii) *L* asserts *p* to *D*."<sup>50</sup> The definition of assertion that they provide is as follows: "*L* asserts *p* to *D* =<sub>df.</sub> *L* states *p* to *D* and does so under conditions which, he believes, justify *D* in believing that he, *L*, not only accepts *p*, but also intends to contribute causally to *D*'s believing that he, *L*, accepts *p*."<sup>51</sup> Chisholm and Feehan's definition may be put more formally as follows:

- (L8) To lie (to another person) =<sub>df.</sub> to make a believed-not-true or believed-false statement (to another person), under conditions that are such that, firstly, it is believed (by the person making the statement) that it is justified (for the other person) to believe that that statement is believed to be true (by the person making the statement), and secondly, it is believed (by the person making the statement) that it is justified (for the other person) to

believe that it is intended (by the person making the statement) that it be believed (by the other person) that that statement is believed to be true (by the person making the statement).

According to L8, a liar is only lying if the conditions are such that, firstly, the liar believes that her intended victim is justified in believing that the liar is being truthful, and secondly, the liar believes that her intended victim is justified in believing that the liar intends that her intended victim believe that she is being truthful. However, according to L8, it is not necessary for lying that the liar believes that her intended victim is justified in believing her untruthful statement to be true: "It may be that the intended deception does not pertain to the assertion—to the proposition  $p$  that  $L$  asserts to  $D$ . But it does pertain to the proposition that the victim could express by saying "He is now asserting a proposition—namely,  $p$ —which he accepts." For the liar intends to contribute to  $D$ 's acquiring the belief that he, the liar, is now asserting something that he accepts."<sup>52</sup> In the case of the crime boss, Maximilian, telling the undercover agent, Alessandro, "There are no informants in my organization," since Maximilian believes that Alessandro is justified in believing that Maximilian believes this untruthful statement to be true, and since Maximilian also believes that Alessandro is justified in believing that Maximilian intends that Alessandro believe that Maximilian believes this untruthful statement to be true, it follows that, according to L8, Maximilian is lying.

However, in the case in which Sarah tells Andrew "Sproggit plc is about to launch a takeover bid for the company," since Sarah does not believe that Andrew is justified in believing that she believes this untruthful statement to be true—since she believes that Andrew believes that she is being untruthful, because of what Charlie has said about her—it follows that, according to L8, Sarah is not lying. However, as argued above, it does seem wrong to deny that Sarah is lying. Hence, it seems that L8 should be rejected.

## SIMPSON'S DEFINITION

David Simpson has given a complex definition of lying that may be said to be an expanded version of L8:

The liar is doubly insincere in that he or she insincerely presents a belief and insincerely invokes trust in this presentation. So in lying the liar intends to deceive the liee regarding some matter, and intends to satisfy that first intention (at least partly) by deceiving the liee regarding the liar's belief regarding that matter. In lying, however, there is a third level of deceptive intention. For the liar intends to satisfy the secondary intention (at least partly) by establishing the mutual recognition of the sincerity of that belief, and in that being insincere.<sup>53</sup>

Simpson's definition of lying may be put more formally as follows:

(L9) To lie (to another person) =<sub>df.</sub> to make a believed-false statement (to another person) with the intention that that statement be believed to be true (by the other person), and with the intention that it be believed (by the other person) that that statement is believed to be true (by the person making the statement), and with the intention that it be believed (by the other

person) that it is intended (by the person making the statement) that it be believed (by the other person) that that statement is believed to be true (by the person making the statement).

According to L9, a liar is necessarily attempting to do three things: to get the intended victim to believe her untruthful statement to be true; to get the intended victim to believe that the liar believes this untruthful statement to be true; and to get the intended victim to believe that the liar intends that the intended victim believe that the liar believes this untruthful statement to be true. Paul Faulker endorses Simpson’s definition: “A speaker *S*’s assertion to an audience *A* that *p* is a lie if and only if: (1) *S* believes that *p* is false; and (2) *S* intends that (i) *A* come to believe that *p*, (ii) *A* recognizes his intention that (i), and (iii) *A*’s believing that *S* believes that *p* is *A*’s reason for (ii) being a reason for (i).”<sup>54</sup>

Like L7, and unlike L8, L9 requires that a liar intends that the intended victim believe her untruthful statement to be true. Hence, according to L9, Maximilian is not lying to Alessandro when he makes the untruthful statement to him that “There are no informants in my organization.” Like L7 and L8, L9 requires that a liar intends that the intended victim believe that the liar believes her untruthful statement to be true. Hence, according to L9, Sarah is not lying to Andrew when she makes the untruthful statement to him that “Sproggit plc is about to launch a takeover bid for the company.”

However, as argued above, many hold that Maximilian is lying, and it does seem wrong to deny that Sarah is lying. Hence, it seems that L9 should be rejected.

### CARSON’S DEFINITION

Thomas L. Carson has provided a definition of lying that differs from most other definitions insofar as it does not include an intention to deceive. According to Carson, so long as a believed-false, or believed-probably-false, or simply not-believed-true, statement, that is false, is made by someone in a context in which that person thereby warrants the truth of the statement to her intended audience, and so long as the person making the statement does not take herself to be not warranting the truth of the statement, then the person is lying:

A person *S* tells a lie to another person *S1* iff: 1. *S* makes a false statement *x* to *S1*, 2. *S* believes that *x* is false or probably false (or, alternatively, *S* doesn’t believe that *x* is true), 3. *S* states *x* in a context in which *S* thereby warrants the truth of *x* to *S1*, and 4. *S* does not take herself to be not warranting the truth of what she says to *S1*.<sup>55</sup>

Carson’s definition may be put more formally as follows:

(L10) To lie (to another person) = <sub>df.</sub> to make a not-believed-true, and false, statement (to another person), in a context in which the truth of the statement is thereby warranted (by the person making the statement) (to the other person), (the person making the statement) not believing that the truth of the statement is not being warranted (by the person making the statement) (to the other person).

Unlike most other definitions of lying, L10 does not require untruthfulness, as this has been understood by other definitions. According to L10, a person can be lying if she makes a statement that she does not believe to be true, but does not believe to be false, either. For example, if Lykke doesn't know when the library closes, but she tells Larissa "The library closes at 10:00 P.M.," and the context is such that she thereby warrants the truth of her statement—for example, she is not on stage acting in a play—and she doesn't believe that she is not warranting the truth of her statement—for example, she doesn't believe that she is engaged in some kind of a game that allows for making statements that are not believed to be true—and if it happens to be false that the library closes at 10:00 P.M., then she is lying. Furthermore, unlike most other definitions of lying, L10 requires falsity. According to L10, Ibbieta does not lie to the guards when he tells them that Gris is hiding out at the cemetery, which he believes to be false, because it just so happens to be true that, unbeknownst to Ibbieta, Gris is hiding out at the cemetery. In cases such as this, "I intend to lie in this case but I don't."<sup>56</sup>

Most importantly, unlike most other definitions of lying, L10 does not require an intention to deceive. Carson provides the following example of a case in which there is no intention to deceive, and yet which, according to him, is a case of lying:

Suppose that I witness a crime and clearly see that a particular individual committed the crime. Later, the same person is accused of the crime and, as a witness in court, I am asked whether or not I saw the defendant commit the crime. I make the false statement that I did not see the defendant commit the crime, for fear of being harmed or killed by him. It does not necessarily follow that I intend that my false statements deceive anyone. (I might hope that no one believes my testimony and that he is convicted in spite of it.) Deceiving the jury is not a means to preserving my life. Giving false testimony is necessary to save my life, but deceiving others is not; the deception is merely an unintended "side effect." I do not intend to deceive the jury in this case, but it seems clear that my false testimony would constitute a lie.<sup>57</sup>

Importantly, the claim here is not that such a person would be perjuring himself—as it happens, he would be<sup>58</sup>—but that such a person would be lying, although without any intention that he be believed, and hence, without any intention that anyone be deceived.

Many will reject L10 because it does not require untruthfulness. It will be argued that lack of belief in the truth or falsehood of the statement that one makes is insufficient for lying, since this entails that one can be lying even if one does not believe that the statement that one makes is false, and for lying, one must believe the statement that one makes is false. Many will also reject L10 because it requires falsity. It does seem peculiar that whether or not one is lying depends upon luck, and it does seem wrong to deny that Ibbieta is lying, simply because his statement happens to be true.<sup>59</sup>

There is at least one further problem with L10. According to L10, it is the context in which the statement is made that makes it the case that the person making the statement is warranting the truth of her statement to her audience. The context that makes it the case that the person is warranting the truth of her statement is

wholly independent of the person making the statement. In the example of the witness giving testimony above, it is the context—that of giving testimony in the witness box in a trial—that makes it the case that the witness is warranting the truth of his statement to his audience. However, consider the following case provided by Carson. A speaker gives a speech, believing that he is speaking to an audience expecting a speech about current events, in which he makes untruthful and false statements about a politician, in order to discredit him before an election. Unbeknownst to him, however, his audience is expecting a humorous speech:

I intend to tell this story and warrant its truth to an audience interested in current events, but, unbeknownst I am speaking to an audience expecting to hear political satire and humor. My statements about the politician are false, I know that they are false, and I intend to warrant their truth. However, my definition implies that I haven't lied, because, contrary to my intentions, I did not warrant the truth of my statement. In this case, I intended to lie, but failed to due to my failure to warrant the truth of what I said.<sup>60</sup>

According to L10, since the context is one that makes it the case that the speaker is not warranting the truth of his statement to his audience (because his audience is expecting a humorous speech), it follows that the speaker is not lying. However, most would reject this verdict. Most would hold that the speaker is lying in this case—although he happens not to deceive his audience.<sup>61</sup> Most would hold that if one makes an untruthful and false statement to an audience, and if one intends to warrant the truth of that statement to one's audience, then one is lying, even if, unbeknownst to one, the context is such that one's audience does not take one to be warranting the truth of one's statement to them, and hence, one's audience does not believe one's statement to be true.<sup>62</sup> Hence, it seems that L10 should be rejected.

### FALLIS'S DEFINITION

Don Fallis has provided a definition of lying that, like L10, differs from most other definitions of lying insofar as it does not include an intention to deceive. According to Fallis, so long as an untruthful statement is made to another person in a context in which the person making the statement believes that the Gricean conversational norm of truthfulness "Do not say what you believe to be false"<sup>63</sup> is in place, then the person is lying:

You *lie* to X if and only if: 1. You state that *p* to X. 2. You believe that you make this statement in a context where the following norm of conversation is in effect: *Do not make statements that you believe to be false*. 3. You believe that *p* is false.<sup>64</sup>

Fallis's definition may be put more formally, as follows:

(L11) To lie (to another person) = <sub>df.</sub> to make a believed-false statement (to another person) while believing that the context is one in which the norm 'Do not say what you believe to be false' is in effect.

According to L11, lying consists entirely in being untruthful when one believes that one is in a context in which one should not be untruthful. Like L10, therefore, lying does not require any intention to deceive. However, unlike L10, L11 does

require untruthfulness. The liar must believe that the statement she makes is false, and not merely not believe it to be true. Also, according to L11, and unlike L10, whether or not the context is one in which the truthfulness norm 'Do not say what you believe to be false' is in effect is determined entirely by the beliefs of the person making the statement. For example, to refer to the case of the speaker making an untruthful (and false) statement to an audience expecting a humorous speech, since the speaker believes that he is giving a speech to an audience that is expecting a serious speech, it follows that he believes that the truthfulness norm 'Do not say what you believe to be false' is in effect, even though it is not in effect. Hence, according to L11, the speaker is lying, even if his audience believes that he is joking.

There is at least one problem with L11. According to L11, there must be a difference between making an untruthful statement while believing that one is in a context in which the norm of truthfulness is in effect, and making an untruthful statement while intending that one's statement be believed to be true. Otherwise, making an untruthful statement while believing that one is in a context in which the norm of truthfulness is in effect *just is* having the intention that one's statement be believed to be true. It must be possible, therefore, to make an untruthful statement, while believing that one is in a context in which the norm of truthfulness is in effect, and not intend that one's untruthful statement be believed to be true. It is precisely this case that many may reject as an example of lying, however. For example, if a police officer interrogates forty witnesses to a murder in a bar on a particular night, and all forty witnesses state untruthfully "I was in the bathroom at the time and did not see the murder," believing the context to be one in which the norm of truthfulness is in effect, but without the intention that the officer believe this statement to be true, and with the intention that the officer believe this statement to be false, and with the further intention that the officer believe they do not wish to inform on the murderer, then according to L11, they are all lying. However, at least some would argue that in this case, although the witnesses are, presumably, guilty of giving false evidence, and of obstructing the investigation, since they intend to be disbelieved, and since they intend that the officer believe the truth (namely, that they do not wish to inform on the murderer), they are not lying. Hence, it seems that L11 may be rejected.

## CONCLUSION

Having reviewed a number of different definitions of lying, this article contends that the two best definitions of lying available are the definition of lying advanced by Joseph Kupfer (and defended by many others), as well as the modification of that definition, as follows:

- (i) To lie (to another person) = <sub>df.</sub> to make a believed-false statement (to another person) with the intention that that statement be believed to be true (by the other person).
- (ii) To lie (to another person) = <sub>df.</sub> to make a believed-false statement (to another person), either with the intention that that statement be believed

to be true (by the other person), or with the intention that it be believed (by the other person) that that statement is believed to be true (by the person making the statement), or with both intentions.<sup>65</sup>

## Endnotes

1. The concern of this article is with lying to others. While the article does not rule out the possibility of lying to oneself, and considers definitions of lying that allow for the possibility of lying to oneself, the focus of the article is on lying to others, and on definitions of lying that are concerned with lying to others.

2. "Verbs like 'spell,' 'catch,' 'solve,' 'find,' 'win,' 'cure,' 'score,' 'deceive,' 'persuade,' 'arrive,' and countless others signify not merely that some performance has been gone through, but also that something has been brought off by the agent going through it. They are verbs of success." (Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949], 130)

3. See J. L. Austin, *How To Do Things With Words* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 101f.

4. There is limited amount of disagreement about this matter. Charles Fried, for example, appears to hold that a lie that is "seen through" by its audience while it is being told to them is not a lie, and hence, is unsuccessful, is not a lie, but is an attempted lie: "The truly marginal case—perhaps we might call this an attempted lie—is the case in which the hearer not only does not believe what he is being told, but does not even believe that the speaker believes it" (*Right and Wrong* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978], 59).

5. David Livingstone Smith, *Why We Lie: The Evolutionary Roots of Deception and the Unconscious Mind* (NY: St. Martin's Press, 2004), p. 14 (emphasis in the original).

6. *Ibid.*, 30.

7. *Ibid.*, 14. It should be noted that, technically, breast implants and hairpieces are not forms of behavior.

8. *Ibid.*

9. This would seem to entail that the very first time an organism engaged in the relevant behavior (that was later selected for) that provided others with false information, or that deprived them of true information, the organism was not lying, if this behavior was accidental.

10. "True information" may be a semantic pleonasm, if "false information" is a contradiction in terms, because information is necessarily true.

11. For an argument against this position, see my "Kant on Keeping a Secret," *Listening: Journal of Religion and Culture* (forthcoming).

12. Smith, *Why We Lie*, 14.

13. Paul Ekman, *Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics, and Marriage* (NY: Norton & Company, 1985), 26.

14. *Ibid.*, 28.

15. It may be argued that concealing is necessarily intentional, and hence, that "intentional concealment" is a semantic pleonasm. Since, in his definition of lying, Ekman is only concerned with concealment insofar as it is intentional, it does not matter, for his definition, if there can be unintentional concealing, since this could never be lying.

16. Aldert Vrij, *Detecting Lies and Deceit: The Psychology of Lying and the Implications for Professional Practice* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2000), 6.

17. *Ibid.*

18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. See my "A Definition of Deceiving," *International Journal of Applied Philosophy* 21 (2007): 181–194.
21. Warren Shibles, *Lying: A Critical Analysis* (Whitewater, WI: The Language Press, 1985), 33.
22. Ibid., 57.
23. Augustine, *On Lying*, trans. M. S. Muldowney, in *Treatises on Various Subjects*, vol. 16 of *Fathers of the Church*, ed. R. J. Deferrari (NY: Fathers of the Church, 1952), 55.
24. Paul Griffiths, *Lying: An Augustinian Theology of Duplicity* (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2004), 25f.
25. For an alternative definition of lying in Augustine, see Thomas D. Feehan, "Augustine on Lying and Deception," *Augustinian Studies* 19 (1988): 131–9. See also his "The Morality of Lying in St. Augustine," *Augustinian Studies* 21 (1990): 67–81; and "Augustine's Own Examples of Lying," *Augustinian Studies* 22 (1991): 165–90.
26. Roderick M. Chisholm and Thomas D. Feehan, "The Intent to Deceive," *Journal of Philosophy*, 74 (1977): 150; Glen Newey, "Political Lying: A Defense," *Public Affairs Quarterly* 11 (1997): 95.
27. Frederick Siegler, "Lying," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 3 (1966): 128.
28. Newey, "Political Lying: A Defense," 102.
29. Sissela Bok, *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life* (NY: Random House, 1978), 13–14.
30. J. A. Barnes, *A Pack of Lies: Towards A Sociology of Lying* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 11.
31. Nathan Rotenstreich, "On Lying," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 10 (1956): 415.
32. Note that, unlike her follower, Barnes, Bok is not consistent about the possibility of truthful lying. At times in her book, she appears to contrast lying with being "truthful" (e.g., 84f).
33. Arnold Isenberg, "Deontology and the Ethics of Lying," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 24 (1964): 469.
34. Corrie ten Boom, with John Sherrill and Elizabeth Sherrill, *The Hiding Place* (NY: Bantam Books, 1971), 91.
35. Newey, "Political Lying: A Defense," 94.
36. Bernard Gert, *Common Morality: Deciding What to Do* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 40.
37. Chisholm and Feehan, "The Intent to Deceive," 156.
38. Linda Colemand and Paul Kay, "Prototype Semantics: The English Verb 'lie,'" *Language* 57 (1981): 28.
39. Jean-Paul Sartre, "Le Mur," in *La Nouvelle Revue Française* 286 (1937): 38–62.
40. Joseph Kupfer, "The Moral Presumption Against Lying," *Review of Metaphysics* 36 (1982): 104.
41. Igor Primoratz, "Lying and the 'Methods of Ethics,'" *International Studies in Philosophy* 16 (1984): 54n2.
42. Bernard Williams, *Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 96.

43. *Ibid.*, 96–7.

44. Newey, “Political Lying: A Defense,” 96.

45. *Ibid.*, 100.

46. Frankfurt, “The Faintest Passion,” in *Necessity, Volition and Love* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5.

47. Frankfurt, “On Bullshit,” in *The Importance of What We Care About* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 120.

48. *Ibid.*

49. Newey, “Political Lying: A Defense,” 98.

50. Chisholm and Feehan, “The Intent to Deceive,” 152.

51. *Ibid.*

52. *Ibid.*, 153.

53. David Simpson, “Lying, Liars and Language,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 52 (1992): 625.

54. Paul Faulkner, “What is Wrong with Lying,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 75 (2007): 527–8.

55. Thomas L. Carson, “The Definition of Lying,” *Noûs* 40 (2006): 298.

56. *Ibid.*, 285.

57. *Ibid.*, 289.

58. To commit perjury is to willfully make an untruthful and false statement, as to facts material to the hearing, while under oath to testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, before a competent tribunal, officer, or person (Stuart P. Green, *Lying, Cheating: A Moral Theory of White-Collar Crime* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006], 133). As can be gleaned from this definition, an intention to deceive is not required for committing perjury.

59. Note that in a footnote, Carson says that his definition of lying may be modified so that it does not require falsity: “A person S tells a lie to another person S1 iff: 1. S makes a statement x to S1, 2. S believes that x is false or probably false (or, alternatively, S doesn’t believe that x is true), 3. S states x in a context in which S thereby warrants the truth of x to S1, and 4. S does not take herself to be not warranting the truth of what she says to S1” *ibid.*, 306.

60. *Ibid.*, 296.

61. See Don Fallis, “What Is Lying?,” *Journal of Philosophy* (forthcoming).

62. It may further be asked, here, what it means to intend to warrant the truth of one’s statement to one’s audience. If it means to intend that they believe one’s statement to be true, then it is a deceptive intention. If it does not, then it is not clear what it means. Can one intend to warrant the truth of one’s statement, and, at the same time, not intend that one’s statement be believed to be true?

63. H. P. Grice, *Studies in the Ways of Words* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 27.

64. Fallis, “What Is Lying.”

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